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LEGAL ACCEPTANCE OF ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES IN GREAT BRITAIN
AND THE UNITED STATES:
SOME LESSONS FROM HISTORY
Abstract: This paper examines and contrasts nineteenth century
case law in Great Britain and the United States in which courts
had to decide whether to accept accounting concepts having to do
with making provisions for depreciation, amortization and depletion. It should be emphasized that the courts were not arguing
about accounting theory, per se; they were deciding particular
disputes, which depended on the meaning in each case of profits.
By 1889, when Lee v. Neuchatel Asphalte Company was decided,
British courts had rejected accepted fixed asset accounting conventions in determining profits in tax, dividend, and other cases
while United States courts accepted these conventions, except in
the case of wasting asset companies. This historical contrast is of
particular interest because a recent reversal of these countries
legal stances has occurred through legislation. In the United
States, the Revised Model Business Corporation Act and the
legislatures of several states have now rejected accounting concepts of profit as the legal test for dividends and other shareholder
distributions. The reasons for this rejection appear to be similar to
those used by the British Court of Appeal nearly 100 years ago. In
Great Britain, on the other hand, the 1980 Companies Act reverses
much of the Lee case and places on accountants new responsibilities for determining whether company distributions to
shareholders would violate the capital maintenance provisions of
the act.

Almost 100 years ago, in 1889, the British Court of Appeal
decided Lee v. Neuchatel Asphalte Company1 and this case continues to be cited by accountants interested in the development
of thought. The Lee decision is frequently interpreted to mean
that companies are not required to make provisions for depreciation, but the debate over the meaning and significance of
this case is not over [Morris, 1986].
Lee was the culmination of a series of nineteenth century
legal cases in Britain where courts had to decide whether to
1

Case citations are contained in the Table of Cases in the References.
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accept particular accounting techniques for fixed assets in the
formulation of legal rules defining profits. At this same time,
legal doctrines often taking a different view were developing in
the United States. It should be emphasized that the courts were
not arguing about abstract accounting theory in these cases.
They were concerned with resolving disputes between particular parties and a variety of equitable considerations influenced their decisions. However, because the litigants' rights
and obligations depended on the meaning of profits and income, the courts had to determine what principles of profit
measurement should apply in the particular case.
The purpose of this paper is to compare these nineteenth
century British and United States legal cases in which methods
of accounting for fixed assets were first debated. The legal rules
which emerged then endured for almost 100 years but are now
the subject of renewed debate. In both Great Britain and the
United States legislation was enacted in 1980 which reverses,
in part, that country's century-old legal rules and adopts, in
part, the other country's. A historical analysis should enlighten
our understanding of these recent developments and the nature
of the legal concern about certain accounting concepts. It also
provides the opportunity to look at rule-making in accounting
in a broad historical context.
The British cases concerning accounting for fixed assets
will be discussed first, followed by American developments.
Then a postscript describes and contrasts recent legislative
developments in Great Britain and the United States.
THE BRITISH CASES
It is frequently stated that the 1889 case of Lee v. Neuchatel
Asphalte Company broke with prior British law, in which the
"capital maintenance doctrine" prevailed (see e.g. Robson
[1927, p. 266]; Yamey [1941, p. 278]; and French [1977, p. 322]).
A brief review of these early cases on capital maintenance is
followed by: a discussion of British tax cases which considered
the deductability of expense due to depreciation, amortization
and depletion. These early cases set the stage for the Lee
decision.
Pre-Lee British Legal Cases
The British legal cases decided before Lee are discussed in
Reid [1987a, 1987b]. Although no consistent concept of profit or
depreciation emerged, these cases tend to support the view that
British courts prior to Lee required the adoption of accounting
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol15/iss1/1
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methods which provided for capital maintenance. Early on, the
courts held that dividends were payable out of profits, and
could not be paid from capital [MacDougall v. Jersey Imperial
Hotel Co., Ltd. (1864)]. In some cases, the balance sheet surplus
test was said to be the appropriate concept for determining
profits, see, e.g. Binney v. Ince Hall Coal and Cannel Company
(1866) and Helby's Case (1866). Holdings and dicta stated that
assets which had been stolen [Henry v. The Great Northern
Railway Company (1857)], destroyed [Stringer's Case (1869)], or
became irrecoverable [Flitcroft's Case (1882)], needed to be
accounted for. Support also was given for making provision for
the depreciation of fixed assets [Rishton v. Grissell (1868); Mills
v. Northern Railway of Buenos Ayres Company (1870); Lord
Rokeby v. Elliot (1878, 1880); Davison v. Gillies (1879); and
Kehoe v. The Waterford and Limerick Railway Company (1888)]2
and the amortization of leases [Riston v. Grissell (1868)]. However, not all decisions were in accord. 3 Thus while the capital
maintenance doctrine seemed fairly well established by these
cases, it was not well-defined.
In this same period, other British courts considered the
question of accounting for fixed assets in income tax cases.
Here the courts largely rejected the application of accounting
techniques which called for deductions for depreciation, depletion and amortization. These cases contrast with the pre-1889
decisions involving private parties, where different considerations appear to have prevailed.
Rulings in Pre-Lee British Tax Cases4
Generally, the British courts were zealous in protecting the
Crown's revenue. In Addie and Sons v. The Solicitor of Inland
Revenue (1875) a coal mining company claimed that it ought to
be allowed a deduction for expenditures on pitsinking and for
depreciation of machinery and plant. The court disallowed the
deduction (p. 432) and said that expenditures on developing a

2
But see Dent v. The London Tramways Company (1880), where a company
was required to pay preferred stockholders dividends out of the current year's
profits, after taking account of depreciation for the year, although in prior
years insufficient depreciation reserves had been established and, therefore,
capital was impaired.
3
See, e.g Lambert v. Neuchatel Asphalte Company (1882), which involved
the same company as the later Lee case.
4
British tax case citations were found in Mew's Digest [1884; 1898] under
the heading "Revenue — Taxes and Duties."
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mine are assets and "must be placed to capital account in any
properly kept books."
Similarly, in F order v. Handyside and Co. (1876) a deduction for depreciation of machinery was not permitted and the
court said the depreciation was like an accrual for future
repairs. The Income Tax Act did not permit deductions for
repairs in excess of the average amount expended in the three
previous years. 5 The court noted that when the company subsequently made repairs "perfect justice would be done . . . and
the deductions which the company now claim would in the
long run, be allowed them" (p. 65). The court also refused with
some "reluctance" to allow an insurance company to deduct
estimated claims noting that they could be deducted when paid
[The Imperial Fire Insurance Company v. Wilson (1876)]. The
reason was that any estimate of risk would be speculative and
could result in the company reporting no income (p. 273). This
decision was in sharp contrast to the case law where directors
were required to take account of pending risks in determining
divisible profits. 6
However, the Knowles v. McAdam (1877) decision permitted a company to deduct as an expense leasehold amortization.
Here, a colliery company had claimed a deduction for depreciation, determined by a revaluation and allegedly caused by
the year's coal depletion and lease expiration. 7 While the court
said that the deduction was misnamed "depreciation," it focused on the lease amortization and did not actually decide
whether an owner of a mine, as opposed to a lessee, could
deduct depreciation (p. 29):
Suppose a man pays 1000£ for a lease of the mine for
one year only. At the end of the year he has got all
the coal in the mine and sold it for 1200£, the
expenses of labour and materials being 100£. Is his
profit 1100£? It would be an abuse of language to say
so. His profit is what remains in his pocket after
deducting the expenses, namely 1000£ for the liberty
to get the coal and 100£ for the cost of getting it.
The decision involved a number of issues. In particular, the
tax act prohibited deductions on account of "diminution of

5

Income Tax Act of 1842, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 35, Schedule D, sec. 100, Rule 3.
See e.g. Rance's Case (1870)
7
The amount claimed was less than provided by a straight-line amortization of the leasehold property, which cost 717,421 pounds and had an average
of 32 years to run.
6
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capital," 8 but the court decided that this provision did not
apply. It relied on Lord Cairns' statement in Gowan v. Christie
(1873)9 who seemed to view a mineral deposit as inventory:
"What we call a mineral lease is really, when properly considered, a sale out and out of a portion of land."
In 1878, the British Income Tax Act was amended to
permit deductions for depreciation due to wear and tear, 10
further indicating acceptance of the acountant's concept of
profit.
But, in Coltness Iron Company v. Black (1881) the House of
Lords reversed this incipient trend. 11 Lord Blackburn called
the Knowles decision, where the court treated 32-year leases
like an inventory of coal "startling."
The effect of this would be that though the mines
were worked so as to produce a large profit above the
working expenses, yet if they were worked by a
purchaser who had overestimated the value of the
minerals, and paid such a price for them that he was
a loser, no income tax was to be paid in respect of
those mines. That is a result which never could have
been intended by the Legislature, and . . . it seems to
me a reductio ad absurdum . . . " (p. 338)

8
Schedule D, Section 159 provided that " . . . it shall not be lawful to make
any other deductions therefrom than such as are expressly enumerated in this
Act; . . . nor to make any deduction from the profits or gains arising from any
property herein described . . . . on account of diminution of capital employed or
of loss sustained in any trade . . . "
9
This case considered whether a tenant had the right to abandon a lease
because it was unprofitable. Lord Cairns said there was no way to determine
whether it was a profitable lease: "[H]ow would it be possible at the end of the
third or the fourth year of the lease, to speculate as to what the profit or loss
would be if it were spread over the whole period of the lease. How can you at
the end of the third or the fourth year of the lease tell what the price of labour
may be in future years; or what machinery may be introduced in future, which
may dispense to a certain extent with labour; or what the market value of
minerals of the same kind will be at a future period, or what the effect upon the
market value of those minerals may be of the discovery of other minerals of the
same kind in the same neighbourhood. All those things are perfectly uncertain"
(p. 284).
10
Customs and Inland Revenue Act of 1878, 41 Vict. c. 15, sec. 12. Depletion
and leasehold amortization were not separately mentioned.
11
In an 1880 case, Watney and Co. v. Musgrave, the court held that amortization of a pub lease was not an expense of a brewery, since buying up pub
leases was not the business of a brewery. Although the judges admitted the
similarity to advertising expense, in that this practice increased trade, they
were not sure that advertising expense would be deductable either.
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In Coltness expenditures on a mine were capitalized and
then allocated to the cost of production. Earl Cairns (p. 324)
and Lord Blackburn (p. 339) thought that this method allowed
the "owner of a mine [to] . . . manipulate his accounts . . . " 12
This concern about manipulation had also been expressed in
other cases involving deductions for noncash expenses. 13
Equity among taxpayers also was considered. Both Lord
Penzance and Lord Blackburn felt that the Income Tax Act, as
it applied to mines, was a form of property tax. As in the case
of other property subject to taxation on its value, its cost (and,
by implication, accounting techniques to amortize that cost)
was irrelevant. In effect, Blackburn commented that cost and
accounting concepts of income often are disregarded in determining income taxes and the situation here is no different (p.
336):
It has also been sometimes argued that it is very
unjust to tax at the same rate a terminable interest,
such as that in a mine, which must at some time be
worked out, and a fee simple interest, which will
endure so long as this world continues in its present
state . . . . There is much force in the argument on the
other side, that if the interest is terminable, so is the
tax . . . . [T]here can be no doubt that the same annual charge is imposed upon a terminable annuity
and on one in perpetuity; and, what seems harder,
that the same annual charge is imposed upon a
professional income, earned by hard labour, often
extending over many years before any return is got,
and, when earned, precarious, as depending on the
health of the earner. 14
12

It is unclear from the facts given whether the company was guilty of
manipulating its accounts to the detriment of the tax assessor. The company
claimed a deduction for pitsinking of £9,927; the company's total expenditure
on pits still in operation was £97,537. Its earliest working pit was opened in
1849. Over the 20 year period from 1858 to 1878, pitsinking expenditures
amounted to £165,825 and pits were exhausted during the period on which
£102,678 had been expended. For the six years from 1872 to 1878, costs were
£71,965 and pits exhausted in these years had cost £44,013.
13
Interestingly, Pixley [1881] was published the year Coltness was decided
and he also viewed mines as relatively permanent property. Pixley thought
that the purchase of a mine was similar to the purchase of a business; the good
will or "purchase of business" asset would be good "So long as the Company is
prosperous" (p. 146). Pixley did recommend that, instead of dividing all its
profits, the company "raise" a sinking fund to write off this asset if its cost
exceeded its realizable value (p. 147).
14
This anology involving the depreciation of human capital is occasionally
alluded to in the literature. See e.g. May [1943, p. 27].
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The final consideration in Coltness involved the need for
certainty in collecting taxes. Deductions for noncash expenses
introduced the possibility of tax avoidance. As Lord Blackburn
pointed out the "object of the [framers of the Income Tax Act]
is to grant a revenue at all events, even though a nearer
approximation to equality may be sacrificed in order more
easily and certainly to raise that revenue . . . " (p. 330).
Thus, concerns about taxpayer manipulation of noncash
expenses, equity in the treatment of taxpayers, and a desire for
certainty in revenue collections appeared to motivate these tax
cases. However, before 1889 the tax cases were different than
those where courts were called upon to determine income or
profits for other purposes. Then, in 1889, the Court of Appeal
decided Lee v. Neuchatel Asphalte Company and it shocked the
accounting world.
Lee v. Neuchatel Asphalte Company (1889)
The Neuchatel Asphalte Company's major asset was a
terminable concession to work a mine. A shareholder claimed
that dividends could not legally be paid until two conditions
were met; first, the company must own net assets equal in
value to the nominal (par) value of its outstanding shares; and
second, "depreciation" of the concession had to be provided
for.
The first condition is rarely mentioned in the literature.
The complaining shareholder was arguing, in effect, that the
stock was watered. In the Chancery Court, Judge Stirling concluded that the company need not accumulate assets equal in
value to the stated capital before it paid dividends since "In my
opinion, the capital of the company at the time of its formation
really consisted of the aggregate of the assets taken over from
the various selling companies . . . " and the plaintiff had not
proved that these assets had depreciated in value (p. 9).
Of the three judges on the Court of Appeal, only Cotton
commented on this aspect of the case. He noted that the share
purchase contract had been duly registered and, on that basis,
he also disagreed with the shareholder's first claim. In Britain
legislation required companies to register contracts to sell
shares for property (instead of cash) with the Registrar of Joint
Stock Companies. 15 Before Lee the courts had refused to entertain complaints that the property was not worth the nominal
value of the shares provided these registration requirements
15

Companies Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 131, s. 25.
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were met. 16 As a result, nominal capital might bear no relation
to the value of the company's assets, but it was believed that
full disclosure would protect creditors and investors. As Sir
George Jessel noted in Andersons Case (1877), subsequent creditors "were told exactly what it [the property] was" (p. 102)
which served as security for their advances. Then in Lee the
court took the next step in refusing to require the company to
make up the difference between nominal capital and asset
value before paying dividends.
Since the intrinsic value of assets received in return for
shares has no necessary relationship to nominal value, the
accounting convention calling for a regular provision for depreciation is more difficult to justify. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Court of Appeal in Lee v. Neuchatel Asphalte
Company also disagreed with the shareholder's second claim
that a regular provision for depreciation was required.
Although the initial valuation of the company's property
might have concerned accountants, it was the second issue that
provoked the great debate among them [Brief, 1976], fueled by
a number of the judges' comments, including Cotton's statement that "[t]here is no . . . necessity . . . to set apart every year
a sum to answer the supposed annual diminution in the value
of this property from lapse of time" (p. 18) unless required by
contract. Like Stirling in the lower court, Cotton was persuaded by the fairness of the directors' determination that
there were profits because additional advantageous terms had
been obtained from the grantor and, therefore, the concession
was worth more than when it was acquired. This suggests that
in Cotton's view capital, meaning the value of the assets exchanged for shares, should be maintained in some fashion,
although an honest valuation was all that was required.
But the other two judges on the Court of Appeal, Lord
Justices Lindley and Lopes, rejected this notion of capital
maintenance and its underlying balance sheet test of profitability. Moreover, although both comment on wasting asset
companies, neither seems to rely on any attributes peculiar to
capital in these companies. Thus, Lindley said (p. 20):
It is obvious with respect to such property, as with
respect to various other properties of a like kind,
mines and quarries and so on, every ton of stuff
which you get out of that which you have bought
16
See e.g. Pell's Case (1869); Anderson's Case (1877) and In re Ambrose Lake
Tin and Copper Mining Company (1880).
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with your capital may, from one point of view, be
considered as embodying and containing a small
portion of your capital, and that if you sell it and
divide the proceeds you divide some portion of that
which you have spent your capital in acquiring. It
may be represented that that is a return of capital.
All I can say is, if that is a return of capital it appears
to me not to be such a return as is prohibited by law.
This type of comment in Lee has led many to believe that
the court decided special rules applied to wasting asset companies. But this reading of the case is too narrow. For Lindley
also said (p. 22):
[T]he Companies Acts do not require the capital to be
made up if l o s t . . . . [S]uppose a company is formed
to start a daily newspaper; supposing it sinks
£250,000 before the receipts from sales and advertisements equal the current expenses, and supposing
it then goes on, is it to be said that the company
. . . cannot divide profits until it has replaced its
£250,000, which has been sunk in building up a
property which if put up for sale would perhaps not
yield £10,000? That is a business matter left to business men.
Although this statement broke from the traditional "capital
maintenance" view found in earlier dividend cases, in that it
would permit the payment of dividends when capital was
impaired, the statement probably would not, in itself, have
caused great concern among accountants.
But in Lee the company's articles of association specified
that dividends were payable out of profits, and courts in many
previous cases had held that dividends were payable out of
profits whether or not such a private contract existed. 17 Although Lindley recognized that "if you want to find out
. . . whether you have lost your money or not, you must bring
your capital into account somehow or other" (p. 23), he seems
to be saying that dividends could be paid if cash receipts from
operations exceed disbursements (p. 24) without providing for
depreciation.
Lopes explicitly said this and defined the excess of receipts
over disbursements as "current annual profits" (p. 26):

17
The earliest case which claimed the payment of dividends presupposed
profits was an 1849 House of Lords case, Burnes v. Pennell.
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The capital and the revenue accounts appear to me
to be distinct and separate accounts, and, for the
purpose of determining profits, accretions to and
diminutions of the capital are to be disregarded.
These statements embroiled accountants since the determination of "profits" was thought to be their special domain. Thus,
Cooper [1894, p. 1039] said:
The question seems to have been really, Was there
profit? The only way of ascertaining this is by an
account . . . . Then why should not Accountants have
been called, to tell the Court how, in practice, accounts are prepared? An Accountant would have
explained to the Court the impossibility of preparing
a Balance Sheet to show profit without allowing for
waste . . .
And although accountants had argued that certain types of
''fluctuations" in the value of long-term assets should be ignored, they almost all believed that depreciation should enter
into the calculation of profits.
The Court of Appeal's strained definition of capital and
profits permitted the Neuchatel Asphalte Company, within the
constraints of existing case law, to pay a dividend. The court
justified its decision on two grounds. First, Lindley noted, in
terms reminiscent of his earlier treatise [1881, p. 791], the
disagreement regarding what were assets and what were expenses, and reiterated in Lee his opinion that "What is to be
put into a capital account, what into a revenue account is left
to men of business" (p. 21). Thus profits could not be defined
and capital bore no necessary relationship to the value of a
company's property. Second, capital and its maintenance were
irrelevant to the company's ability to pay creditors. According
to Lindley, "The capital may be lost and yet the company may
be a very thriving concern . . . . If they [business men] think
their prospects of success are considerable, so long as they pay
their creditors, there is no reason why they should not go on
and divide profits . . . " (p. 22). The court thus applied a liquidity standard based on surplus cash receipts for dividends 18
which protected creditors but did not "paralyze the trade of
the country" (p. 19). This contrasted with prior law, where
capital maintenance rules were considered a creditor protec18

French [1977, p. 319ff] also suggests that the Court of Appeal in Lee was
adopting a solvency test for dividends, which takes into account liquidity and
outstanding debts.
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tion. Lindley rejected this notion of capital, which he said was
not mandated by Parliament, and he noted that the Companies
Acts did not even require a company to be wound up if it lost
its capital.
Further light is shed on the Court of Appeal's reasoning in
subsequent cases in the "Lee series." 19 In particular, the lack of
relationship between capital as a residual equity claim and
underlying asset values and the importance to creditors of
solvency rather than capital are emphasized. For example, in
Verner v. The General and Commerical Investment Trust Ltd.
(1894), Lindley observed that there was no legal requirement
that "the capital must . . . be represented by assets which, if
sold, would produce it." Thus it is noted that capital was not
equivalent to liquidation value of assets. It was in this case that
the Court distinguished fixed and "circulating" capital 20 and
held that losses of fixed capital (here a large decline in market
value of securities) need not be made up before paying dividends. Although Lindley observed that "capital lost must not
appear in the accounts as still existing intact; the accounts
must show the truth, and not be misleading or fraudulent," he
also observed that the Companies Act did not require that
accounts be kept at all! Again the court emphasized the company was not insolvent (p. 463).
Thus, by 1889 the British courts rejected what were considered at the time, and are now considered to be, accepted fixed
asset account conventions in determining income available for
dividends and taxable income. However, Parliament overturned some of these court decisions by permitting a deduction
for depreciation in determining taxable income. These British
decisions contrast with developments in the United States at

19
See e.g. Verner v. The General and Commercial Investment Trust Ltd.
(1894); Bolton v. Natal Land Co. [1892]; Bosanquet v. St. John D'El Rey Mining
Co. (1897); In re National Bank of Wales [1899], affirmed sub. nom. Dovey v. Cory
[1901]; and Ammonia Soda Co. v. Chamberlain [1918].
20
Although Lee is frequently cited as the first case in which (counsel)
distinguished fixed and circulating or floating capital (see, e.g. Palmer [1912, p.
884]), the term "floating capital" had been used in at least two prior House of
Lords cases, both involving questions of apportionment of income between life
tenants and remaindermen: Irving v. Houston (1803) and Bouche v. Sproule
(1887). The term was also used in several prior dividend cases: Stevens v. The
South Devon Railway Company (1851) (shareholder sues to have dividend
enjoined while large "floating" unsecured debt is unpaid); City of Glasgow
Bank v. Mackinnon (1882), and In re Oxford Benefit Building and Investment
Society (1886).
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this time, where, except for cases involving wasting assets, the
court decisions were more consistent with accounting conventions.
THE UNITED STATES CASES
A number of legal cases arose in the United States in the
nineteenth century in which courts were called upon to decide
profits available for dividends, the amount due employees or
other creditors under profit sharing arrangements, or taxable
income. 21 Of course, no single legal rule has ever existed in the
United States. Each state legislature is free to enact its own
laws and each state court can develop additional common law
rules. New York enacted one of the earliest statutes governing
dividends in 1825 and declared it unlawful for directors to pay
dividends except from the "surplus profits arising from the
business." 22 According to Kehl [1941, p. 12], this statute, more
than any other, influenced the development of dividend legislation in the United States. The Massachusetts statute of 1830
was also influential. It imposed personal liability on directors
who declared dividends when the company was insolvent or
would be rendered insolvent or bankrupt by virtue of the
dividend. 23 Other states adopted rules against capital impairment. 24 Where such statutes existed, they did not define the
content of the terms profit and capital and, therefore, courts
were required to do so in concrete cases.
As in Britain before Lee, American court decisions in the
nineteenth century supplemented this legislation and generally
held that dividends could not be paid unless there were profits
[Morawetz, 1882, p. 346; 1886, p. 410; Munson, 1891, p. 193;
Cook, 1903, p. 1162; Kehl, 1941, p. 22, 23]. According to many
authorities, the protection of creditors was a primary motivation for these rules [see. e.g. Kehl, 1941, p. 17] although dissenting shareholders also are occasionally mentioned as parties
in need of protection [Morawetz, 1886, p. 411].
21
American cases were located through a search of a number of treatises on
corporation law, including Grant [1854], Potter [1881]; Morawetz [1882, 1886];
Taylor [1884], Boone [1887], Clark and Marshall [1902] and Cook [1903]. A
number of articles and books about accounting and dividend law also were
searched, including Reiter [1926], Annotation [1928]; Weiner [1929], Briggs
[1934], Kehl [1939, 1941]; Berle and Fisher [1932], and Hills [1954a; 1954b].
22
New York Laws 1825, c. 325, sec. 2.
23
Mass. Laws, Jan. Sess., 1830, c. 53, sec. 9.
24
This statutory pattern is discussed in Reiter [1926, p. 103ff].
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The determination of profits available for dividends or for
other purposes required rules for valuing assets. Of particular
interest are cases which raised issues of expense recognition
due to depreciation and depletion. American case law on this
topic was not uniform, but, by the late nineteenth century,
legal acceptance of what today would be called the "going
concern" convention was widespread, except in the case of
wasting asset companies. The American cases on wasting asset
companies will be discussed after those which established the
general rules governing accounting for fixed assets.
Recognition of Depreciation
In several early American cases, courts stated that depreciation was not an expense. These included Tutt v. Land (Georgia, 1873), and two United States Supreme Court cases, Eyster
v. Centennial Board of Finance (1876) and United States v.
Kansas Pacific Railway Company (1878). The Supreme Court
comment in Eyster was representative: " . . . according to the
common understanding, [net receipts] ordinarily represent the
profits of a business" (p. 503). In other cases courts disallowed
depreciation for the purposes of determining dividends, apparently because the assets had been maintained through repairs,
additions and improvements [Park v. Grant Locomotive Works
(New Jersey, 1885) and Mackintosh v. Flint & Pere Marquette
Railroad Co. (C.C. E.D. Mich., 1888)].
However, some courts decided deductions for depreciation,
broadly defined, were proper. Thus in Meserve v. Andrews (Massachusetts, 1871) the court determined that loss caused by fire
was deductable in determining profits under a lease. State
savings bank legislation applicable in In re Provident Institution
for Savings (New Jersey, 1878) required the bank to establish
reserves to meet any contingency or loss . . . from the depreciation of its securities or otherwise" (p. 6). And for tax purposes,
the Supreme Court of the United States decided that depreciation in the value of investments in bonds and stock and in the
value of track was deductable in Little Miami & Columbus &
Xenia Railroad Company v. United States (1883). The court
commented that "The law evidently contemplated an annual
statement of accounts, and in this way an annual striking of
balances between gains and losses" (p. 279).
In later cases depreciation tended to be equated with loss
due to wear and tear, as in Conville v. Shook (New York, 1893),
which involved determining compensation under an employee
profit sharing plan. In Whittaker v. Amwell National Bank (New
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Jersey, 1894) the court found that machinery and real estate
should be valued at cost less depreciation for wear and tear,
the appropriate charge to be determined through experience.
However, the concept of depreciation also was associated with
a valuation process and in Hiscock v. Lacy (New York, 1894) the
court decided buildings and real estate should not be depreciated below their real value to deprive a minority shareholder
of dividends.
Depreciation also was an issue in several cases which
involved whether public utility rates were set so low as to
involve an unconstitutional taking of property without just
compensation. Although a California court, in San Diego Water
Company v. City of San Diego (California, 1897), held that
depreciation was not a deductable expense, later rate cases
held otherwise. In a United States Supreme Court case, San
Diego Land and Town Company v. National City (1899), it was
held that "annual depreciation of the plant from natural causes
resulting from its use" (p. 757) ought to be taken into account
when rates were fixed. Other cases, e.g. Milwaukee Electric
Railway & Light Co. v. City of Milwaukee (C.C. E.D. Wisc., 1898),
were in accord.
Courts also permitted companies to make deductions for
the amortization of franchises and other contracts in a rate
case, Milwaukee Electric Railway & Light Co. v. City of Milwaukee (C.C. E.D. Wisc., 1898).
Thus by the late nineteenth century, some agreement appeared to be developing in both federal and state courts that
depreciation was a deductable expense. However, the concept
of depreciation was not uniform; some courts viewed depreciation as an allocation of costs and others saw it as a valuation
procedure. This contrasted with the case law on depletion.
Depletion: The Wasting Asset Doctrine
United States legal doctrine concerning depletion appears
to have originated in two early Pennsylvania tax cases, but
these decisions were inconsistent with a Pennsylvania dividend
decision, Ford v. Locust Mountain Coal Co. (1868). In Ford a
lower court decided that a coal company could, and probably
must, establish a sinking fund for depletion of coal deposits.
Otherwise, the public would be deceived about the value of the
stock and insiders, who understood that dividends were being
paid out of capital, would be able to benefit by selling their
shares to unknowledgeable investors.
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But the Pennsylvania tax cases took another position. In
Commonwealth v. The Ocean Oil Company (1868) an oil company claimed a deduction for oil depletion for income tax
purposes. The trial court instructed the jury that such a deduction was permissable, provided the jury found the oil deposit
was exhaustible: the "jury should act on reasonable probabilities, . . . taking into account the time that it will probably
take to exhaust the capital . . . " (p. 62).
However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed this,
noting that "the capital of oil companies is generally nominal"
(p. 63). But the nominal value was neither the aggregate price
paid for its shares nor the cost of its land and under these
circumstances, no deduction for depletion was allowed.
Further clarification of this position was forthcoming in
Commonwealth v. The Penn Gas Coal Company (Pennsylvania,
1869), where a coal company claimed a deduction for "waste of
capital for coal taken out" (p. 241). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court explained that taxes would be wrongfully avoided if this
deduction were allowed.
All capitals of mining companies, whether of coal,
iron, copper, or tin, or silver or gold, and so of
quarrying companies, whether of stone, marble or
slate, are nominal, like those of petroleum companies, and fixed by their promoters at such large
figures, that, by applying the principle contended for
by the appellees, the whole annual income would
have to be retained to supply the loss of capital,
which would disappoint the stockholders of their
dividends, and the state of her taxes (p. 242).
Other courts also pointed out that capital in mining companies was stated at a nominal value, and as the California
court in In re South Mountain Consolidated Mining Company,
Bankrupt (1881) concluded, "It neither bears nor is intended
nor supposed by the public to bear the slightest relation to the
real value of the property — a value nearly always conjectural,
and very often imaginary" (p. 33). The appellate court agreed
(1882) and held that purchasers of shares in mining companies
did not expressly or impliedly agree to pay the nominal value
of the shares in cash or property. 25 The court also commented
25
In other companies shareholders had to pay the nominal value of the
shares in money or property whose value equaled the nominal value of the
shares. The practical impact of the distinction between mining and other
companies in cases where property (instead of cash) was exchanged for shares
was reduced by the majority rule that good faith director valuations of
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on the inherent problems of valuing mines: "Little is known of
its real value. It may be worth nothing; it may be worth many
millions" (p. 367).
These American cases, all of which preceded Lee (1889),
appear to be the basis for the American legal rules on accounting for fixed assets of mines and valuation of property
exchanged for shares of mines.
COMPARISON OF BRITISH AND UNITED STATES
NINETEENTH CENTURY RULES
In his influential work on corporate law, Morawetz [1886]26
summed up his view of American accounting rules for fixed
assets in terms of two related principles which today would be
called "going concern value." First, (Vol. I, p. 414),
The right of a corporation to declare dividends cannot be determined by reference to the market value
of the company's shares, or the price for which the
assets could be sold. . . .
[T]he property acquired for permanent use in
carrying on business, may be valued at the price
actually paid for it, although it could not be sold
again except at a loss. And even although the business of the company should prove less profitable
than was anticipated, and the value of the whole
concern, and consequently of the shares representing
it, should greatly depreciate in actual value, it would
not be necessary to accumulate the profits until the
depreciation had been made up, and the value of the
shares again raised to par. All that is required is, that
the whole capital originally contributed by the
shareholders be put into the business and kept
there . . . .
The second point concerns the distinction between external
and internal depreciation:
property exchanged for shares were conclusive, although in a minority of
states, where the "true value" rule was adopted, those valuations were subject
to review. See, e.g. Reiter [1926, pp. 95ff).
26
According to Ames [1887] who reviewed this book in the first issue of the
Harvard Law Review, it was generally conceded to be the best contemporary
treatise on the subject of corporations. Morawetz published the first edition of
this treatise in 1882, when he was 23 years old. He appeared to have embarked
on this project because he was unsuccessful in finding employment upon his
graduation from Harvard Law School. Bibliographical material about
Morawetz can be found in Swaine [1946].
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If the capital of a company . . . is invested in machinery, land, or fixtures used in carrying on its business,
the machinery, land, or fixtures may be valued at
their original cost, provided they be kept up in their
original condition.
Any depreciation of the value of the company's
property resulting from the uncertainty of the
speculation in which the company has embarked, or
from a failure to carry on business profitably by
reason of the state of trade, or similar causes, may be
disregarded; but any depreciation caused by design,
accident or wear and tear in using the property,
should be made up out of the earnings before any
dividend is declared.
These views, while similar to those held by British accountants
like Guthrie [1883] and by some British courts before Lee, are
in sharp contrast to those in the Lee series of cases, which
applied to mining and other companies and did not require
provision for either internal or external depreciation.
Legal rules like those in Lee applied in the United States
only to wasting asset companies. Morawetz's explanation of the
special rules for mining companies often has been reflected in
the literature:
The capital of a mining company is not designed to
be used, like that of a banking or manufacturing
company, in carrying on business permanently. The
working of a mine necessarily causes it to become
exhausted and to depreciate in value, and this depreciation cannot be repaired. There would be no object
in accumulating the money obtained by the company
through working the mine, so as to keep up the
original amount of capital. It is implied from the
character of the speculation of a mining company,
that the income derived from working the mine shall
be distributed among the shareholders as dividends,
after deducting the expenses, and making reasonable
provision for contingencies (p. 415).27
27

Morawetz's reasoning in part echoes that of an early British case involving a mine, Binney v. Ince Hall Coal and Cannel Company (1866). There Vice
Chancellor Kindersley, influenced by Adam Smith, determined that waste
needed to be provided for in determining profits. However, he permitted this
joint stock company to return capital to its members. The rationale was that
"It would be extremely detrimental to the shareholders if they were compelled
to keep up a larger capital than they wanted to work with, or than they could
safely employ" (p. 367). This company did not enjoy limited liability and
therefore the customary prohibition against the return of capital to shareholders did not apply.
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The nineteenth century developments in Britain and the
United States described here suggest that courts in these countries had very different ideas about the role of accounting in
formulating legal rules on profits. The Lee cases were profoundly influenced by Lord Lindley, whose views can be traced
to his 1860 treatise on the law of partnerships and companies.
Lindley may have been influenced by economists, as Edwards
[1939, p. 181] suggests, or by accountants themselves. As Gower
[1954, p. 112] pointed out, "Accountants . . . had their own
notions including the division of assets into fixed and circulating and the non-revaluation of the former."
Nevertheless, nineteenth and twentieth century accountants alike have condemned the Lee decision. Discussions contemporary to Lee in the British periodical The Accountant
claimed the decision showed a "feeble grasp of the fundamental principles of accounting," 28 and was "utterly at variance
with the views of all practical accountants and prudent men of
affairs" [Payne, 1892, p. 143]. That journal also denounced the
judgment as "the most mischievous which has ever been given
in relation to company matters" [Weekly Notes, 1889, p. 149]29
Pixley [1906]30 claimed that Lee set "a suicidal policy" regarding dividend payments, "contrary to the practice of soundly
managed public companies." And Morris [1986, p. 72] quotes
other critical 19th century British commentary.
Some British legal scholars who were contemporaries of
Lindley also criticized this decision. Palmer [1898, p. 147], an
important authority on British company law, lamented: "The
extraordinary laxity in regard to the ascertainment of profits
which these decisions countenance, and apparently legalise,
goes far to render the salutary rule, that dividends must not be
paid out of capital, illusory." However, not all British legal
scholars of the time were so critical. In an 1889 "Note" in the
Law Quarterly Review the idea was advanced that Lee had to do
with the doctrine of laissez-faire, and that this case freed
businessmen from unnecessary constraints.
Lawyers, even since the days of Lord Mansfield, have
been too apt to apply a Procrustean formula to merchantile as well as political operations. Happily the
good sense of modern judges has done much to remove the reproach. Business men may grumble at

28
Cited in Hatfield [1916, p. 205]
This remark is quoted in Yamey [1941, p. 279].
30
These remarks are quoted in Hatfield [1916, p. 214].
29
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the law's delay, but they can no longer complain of
its technicality or of being confined in the straitwaistcoat of a legal formula . . . . [Lee] will meet with
the approval of the commercial and legal world.
This idea has been picked up by subsequent United Kingdom
economists and lawyers. For example, Yamey [1941, p. 278]
stated that Lee resulted in "leaving accounting matters to
businessmen." Johnston [1961, p. 545] agreed that this case had
to do with "profits [being] a matter of internal management."
And more recently French [1977, p. 322] also concluded that
the judges in this case gave
full reign to the notion that . . . economic freedom
shall prevail. In doing so they have largely disregarded the conventions of profit measurement used
by accountants, but it would have been pointless for
them to have broken the fetters of the capital
maintenance doctrine only to have another set of
arbitrary constraints imposed in their place. To their
credit the judges have steadfastly refused to let this
happen, helped no doubt by the unimpressive figure
the accountant has cut in the dividend case.
In the United States, on the other hand, Lee was cited in a
number of late nineteenth and early twentieth century American court cases as the "leading authority" for the wasting asset
doctine. 31 These cases also cited Morawetz [1886]. However the
earlier Pennsylvania tax cases were not cited there or in the
extensive commentary on the wasting asset doctrine since this
time.
Some of the American commentary on Lee also adopts the
view that this case established the wasting asset doctrine in
Anglo-American law. For example, Saliers [1916, p. 33], an
early authority on depreciation, wrote that "corporations engaged in mining are exceptions to the rule that the investment
must be kept from diminishing" and he cited Lee as authority.
Morris [1986], p. 77] has more recently suggested that English
lawyers and companies immediately after Lee also believed
that this decision applied only to wasting assets companies and
that this decision did not retard the adoption of depreciation
accounting in general.
31
Excelsior Water and Mining Company v. Pierce (1891); People ex. rel.
United Verde Copper Co. v. Roberts (1898); Boothe v. Summit Coal Min. Co.
(1909); Mellon v. Mississippi Wire Glass Co. (1910); Van Vleet v. Evangeline Oil
Co. (1911); and Stratton's Independence v. Howbert (1912).
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Nevertheless, although Lee was often cited as the source,
the legal doctrines which became dominant in the United
States were first developed by American courts and later explicated by Morawetz [1886]. Slowly the wasting asset exception
was written into the corporation codes of a majority of the
states after it appeared in the Uniform Business Corporation
Act (1928),32 which in turn was apparently influenced by 1927
Delaware legislation. 33
Later American commentary recognizes that Lee and the
subsequent Court of Appeal cases go further than was originally thought and suggest in general that depreciation need not
be accounted for. 34 This later American discussion tended to be
critical of the Lee decision. For example, Street [1930, p. 239]
commented that Lord Lindley's argument that profits were the
source of dividends although capital had been lost was "not
free from sophistry." And Ballantine and Hills [1935, p. 253]
said that " w i t h all deference, the English courts seem
hopelessly 'thing minded' in their ideas about capital." The
American wasting asset doctrine was also considered questionable by many Americans [see, e.g. Ballantine, 1931, p. 465], but
it was, in any event, an exception, not the general rule.
POSTSCRIPT
The fallout from the Lee case has now stopped in Britain
where the 1980 Companies Act35 overturned much of the 1889

32

Section 24(IV). Drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and approved by the American Bar Association at its 1928
meeting. By 1935, eight states permitted wasting asset companies to distribute
net proceeds without allowance for depletion [Ballantine and Hills, 1935, p.
240, n. 82]. By 1946, 17 states had such provisions [Grimes, 1946, p. 206], by
1960, 30 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico did [Model Business
Corporation Act Annotated, 1960, p. 688], and by 1966 five additional states
were added to the roster [Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, 1960,
1966 Pocket Parts, pp. 246ff].
33
Delaware General Corporation Law, Sec. 34, March 1927. This legislation, in turn, apparently was adopted to upset a Delaware court decision which
rejected the wasting asset doctrine, Wittenberg v. Federal Mining & Smelting Co.,
(1926).
34
See e.g. Annotation [1928, p. 42], where it is noted that the "wasting
assets doctrine appears to be but one application" of the English rule dating
from Lee that "capital assets which are impaired or lost need not be replaced in
order to justify the payment of dividends out of the revenue account."
35
The provisions of the 1980 Act are now consolidated in the Companies
Act, 1985.
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decision. This legislation makes capital a cornerstone of investor and creditor protection. In particular, public limited companies are required to have a minimum capital of £50,000 [ss.
117, 118] and independent persons qualified for appointment
as auditors [s. 108(1)] must make valuations of any property
exchanged for shares [s. 103(l)(a)]. Moreover, capital cannot be
eroded by distributions to shareholders. A dual profits/capital
impairment test appears to govern the legality of such distributions. Distributions cannot be made except out of profits [s.
263(1)] which are defined as a company's accumulated,
realized profits, less its accumulated, realized losses [s. 263(3)].
Thus, current profits cannot be distributed, as English law had
held since Lee, without regard to accumulated past losses. In
addition, public limited companies cannot make distributions
if the result would be to reduce the value of the assets below
that of the liabilities and capital [s. 264(1)]. The Act still does
not require that depreciation be provided for, although it does
provide that any reserves or provisions for depreciation are to
be treated as realized losses [s. 264(2)].
Most significant is the fact that whether the profits/capital
impairment tests have been met is to be determined with
reference to relevant accounts [s. 270; 271] accompanied by an
auditor's opinion [s. 271(3), (4)] in which the auditors are
required to report whether the distribution would violate the
Act. Thus the act relies on accounting and auditing to meet its
objectives.
The British Companies Act of 1980 was adopted at least
partially to implement directives of the European Economic
Community and make minimum capital requirements uniform
throughout the Community [Hare, 1980a, p. 503]. But the
changes also are responsive to much of the accounting profession's criticism about the Lee cases since they were decided and
are consistent with recommendations advocated by the Jenkins
Committee on Company Law of 20 years earlier [Hare, 1980b,
p. 586].
However, in the United States the rules adopted in Lee v.
Neuchatel Asphalte Company have now begun to find favor
among the organized legal profession and the legislatures of a
number of states. The Model Business Corporation Act was
amended in 1980 and the amendments abandon the traditional
tests for dividends, based on earned surplus and prohibiting
capital impairment, and retain a single test based on solvency. 36 Dividends are prohibited when a company is insolvent
36
1969 Model Business Corporation Act, sec. 45, amended by financial
provisions, 34 Bus. Law. 1867 (1979), adopted, 35 Bus. Law. 1365 (1980).
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by virtue of lack of liquidity, i.e. inability to pay debts as they
come due [s. 6.40(c)] or insolvent in the bankruptcy sense that
total liabilities (not including capital except where shares have
preferential rights on liquidation) exceed total assets. These
financial provisions were included in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA) of 198 4 37 and have already been
included in the corporation codes of at least eight states. 38 In
two other states, Massachussetts and California, 39 an insolvency test was adopted preceding the 1980 amendments. Experience with the original Model Act suggests that these new
financial provisions will eventually be adopted in many more
states.
In contrast to the 1980 British amendments, directors, not
independent auditors or appraisers, are to be the valuers of
property exchanged for shares [RMBCA s. 6.21 (a)]. Moreover,
the act specifically refuses to adopt generally accepted accounting principles, although these may be used if "reasonable
in the circumstances" [RMBCA, s. 6.40(d)] to test the legality of
distributions. Instead, the Revised Model Act would look to
businessmen for judgments about the important issues of valuation and liquidity. This is exactly what many have said the
Lee case did.
While the accounting profession appears to be regarded
with a new esteem in Britain, the American drafters of the
RMBCA do not rely on accounting conventions to determine
important issues of valuation and creditor protection. The
official comments to the RMBCA note that in practice the
traditional dividend tests, based on profits and capital impairment, have not worked and that shareholders have been
able to make whatever distributions they wanted (RMBCA,
Official Text, p. 123). The official comments (pp. 125ff) lay the
blame for that failure on accountants. Thus the controversy
surrounding the periodic revisions of generally accepted accounting principles is noted, and it is concluded that director
"reasonableness" establishes a better legal standard than accounting:
37

Adopted by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association.
38
Those states are Illinois [Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, Ch. 32, Bus. Corp. Act, s.
9.05]; Indiana [Burns Ind. Statutes Annotated, Title 23, ss. 1-28-1 through
1-28-5]; Minnesota [West's Minn. Stat. Annotated, Vol. 20, s. 302A.551]; Montana [Montana Code Annotated, Vol. 35, ss. 35-1-711]; New Mexico [Michie's
New Mexico Statutes Annotated, Chapter 53, ss. 53-11-44]; South Carolina
[South Carolina Code, ss. 33-9-260]; Virginia [Michie's Virginia Code, ss 13.1653]; and Washington [Washington Revised Code Annotated, ss. 23A.08.420].
39
West's Annotated California Corporation Code, ss. 500 - 503.
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The widespread controversy concerning various accounting principles, and their continuous reevaluation, suggest that a statutory standard of reasonableness, rather than of generally accepted accounting
principles, is appropriate . . . . .
Section 6.40(d) specifically permits determinations to be made . . . on the basis of a fair valuation
or other method that is reasonable in the circumstances. Thus the statute authorizes departures
from historical cost accounting and sanctions the use
of appraisal methods to determine the funds available for distributions.
With some irony, the official comments in connection with
the RMBCA resound of the reasoning of Judge Lindley in the
Lee case. Lindley also felt that capital impairment rules did not
protect creditors because capital lacked defined meaning. He
also believed liquidity, not capital impairment, was a better
test of the validity of a dividend. Other judges were suspicious
of basic conventions like matching of revenue with expenses,
which they said could lead to the manipulation of accounts.
More fundamentally, it was recognized that much of what
influences market value is not reflected in the accounts.
Littleton [1933, p. 214] argued that the development of
accounting conventions was spurred by the necessity of determining profits available for dividends and much has been
written about these developments. Now, after 100 years of
experience, the American Bar Association Committee on Corporate Laws and some state legislatures have apparently concluded that accounting conventions do not matter for this
purpose. This attitude may reflect a struggle for political power
between the legal and accounting professions. Or it may reflect
more fundamental questions about the objectives of accounting
from the perspective, at least, of one important set of users.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper, there appears to
be a growing interest in the interaction of legislation and
judicial decisions in the evolution of legal rules on accounting
and further research which chronologically traces this evolution, beginning with the legislation cited in this paper and the
cases in the Table, might shed further light on the process of
rule-making in accounting. In the 100 years which have elapsed
since the legal decisions discussed here, complex social and
economic developments have undoubtedly affected the recent
developments in the law of accounting. This paper is one
element in that story. However, the question of why the accounting profession in Great Britain has been given greater
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legal responsibilities while the opposite seems to be occurring
in the United States remains an issue which should concern
accountants and therefore merits further study.
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